# Section 4: Tobacco Industry & Youth

Youth are an essential market for the tobacco industry. There are 6.1 million packs of cigarettes bought or smoked by underage youth every year in Colorado, and everyday 1,500 youth become daily smokers. By targeting young people in their product development, tobacco companies are investing in potential life-long addicted customers. Numerous internal tobacco industry documents (you can read them in FS 4.2) reveal that the companies perceive kids as young as 11 years old as a key market. They study the smoking habits of young users and develop products and media campaigns aimed at them. Eighty-six percent of adolescents who smoke use the three most heavily advertised brands- Marlboro, Camel, and Newport-compared to only one-third of adults.\*

The following Fact sheets and Activities teach the history between the large tobacco industries and Congress, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Supreme Court. There are all the resources you need here to provide students with an understanding of their role within the tobacco industry's history and marketing.

## **Fact Sheets**

- 4.1 Big Tobacco Speaks
- 4.2 The Master Settlement Agreement: Then and Now
- 4.3 Tobacco Company Marketing to Kids
- 4.4 Philip Morris and Targeting Kids
- 4.5 Smoking Among Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals
- 4.6 Targeting of Girls and Women
- 4.7 Products Owned By Philip Morris

## **Activities**

Classroom

4.8 Mock Trial

Where is the Food and Drug Administration Tobacco State Settlement: Colorado History U.S. Industry Marketing Graph Who is Altria? Big Victory For Altria

School-Wide

4.9 Not For Sale Mural

## Websites


www.njrebel.com www.fightwithfact.com www.tobaccofreekids.org www.getrealcolorado.com

<sup>\* &</sup>quot;Factsheet: The Toll of Tobacco in the United States of America," Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2005. "Factsheet: Tobacco Company Marketing to Kids," Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 2005.

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), HHS, Results for the 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). Available at: www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k4nsduh/2k4tabs/2k4Tabs.pdf

## **Big Tobacco Speaks**

The years have gone by and so have the lies...



#### 1960s

"Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms."

July 17, 1963 report by then Brown & Williamson general counsel/vice president, Addison Yeaman)

"Smoking a cigarette for the beginner is a symbolic act...' I am no longer my mother's child, I'm tough, I am an adventurer, I'm not square.'.. As the force from the psychological symbolism subsides, the pharmacological effect takes over to sustain the habit."

1969 Philip Morris Report

#### 1970s

"In a sense, the tobacco industry may be thought of as being a specialized, highly ritualized and stylized segment of the pharmaceutical industry. Tobacco products, uniquely, contain and deliver nicotine, a potent drug with a variety of physiological effects."

R.J. Reynolds executive Claude Teague, Jr., "RJR Confidential Research Planning Memorandum on the Nature of the Tobacco Business and the Crucial Role of Nicotine Therein" April 14, 1972

"It's a well known fact that teenagers like sweet products. Honey might be considered."

1972 Brown and Williamson Marketing Memo

"The fragile, developing self-image of the young person needs all of the support and enhancement it can get. Smoking may appear to enhance that image in a variety of ways. If one values, for example, and adventurous, sophisticated, adult image, smoking may enhance one's self image."

Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thought About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market (2/2/73)

"A careful study of the current youth jargon, together with a review of currently used high school American history books and the like ... might be a good start at finding a good brand name and image theme."

Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market (2/2/73)

"To ensure increased and longer-term growth for the Camel Filter, the brand must increase its share penetration among the 14-24 age group which have a new set of more liberal values and which represent tomorrow's cigarette business."

1975 Memo to C.A. Tucker, Vice President for Marketing, RJR

"If you are really truly not going to sell to children, you are going to be out of business in 30 years." Bennett LeBow, Liggett/Brooke Group, Ltd

"Evidence is now available to indicate that the 14-18 year old group is an increasing segment of the smoking population. RJR-T must soon establish a successful new brand in this market if our position in the industry is to be maintained in the long term."

Planned Assumptions and Forecast for the Period 1977-1986 for RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company, March 15, 1978

#### 1980s

"Because of our high share of the market among the youngest smokers, Philip Morris will suffer more than other companies from the decline in the number of teenage smokers."

PM Doc. #1000390803/55, March 31, 1981

"Today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while still in their teens...The smoking patterns of teenagers are particularly important to Philip Morris."

#### 1981 Philip Morris internal document

"Today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while still in their teens...The smoking patterns of teenagers are particularly important to Philip Morris."

1981 report by researcher Myron E. Johnson, sent to Robert E. Seligman, Vice President of Research and Development, Philip Morris

"Younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50 years...Younger adult smokers are the only source of replacement smokers...If younger adults turn away from smoking, the industry must decline, just as a population which does not give birth will eventually dwindle."

"Young Adult Smokers: Strategies and Opportunities," R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company internal memorandum, Feb. 29, 1984

"Sales - Outstanding! Outstanding! Outstanding!...This account is located 2 blocks from Bellingham High School. Our pre-sell has sold through. The account had reordered and received more product."

Sales field report. (PM Doc. #807051949, March 8, 1988)

#### 1990s

"The ability to attract new smokers and develop them into a young adult franchise is key to brand development."

Philip Morris, Five-Year Trends 1988-1992, PM Doc. #2044895379/484

More than 85% of "top 25" films from 1988 - 1997 contained tobacco use, and 70 % of those included brand appearances. Brand appearances were as common in films for teen audiences as for adult audiences and were also present in 20 percent of those rated for children.

The Lancet, vol. 357, January 6, 2000 reporting on study by James Sargent and colleagues from Dartmouth Medical School and the C. Everett Koop Institute, NH

# THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: Then and Now

The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was settled between 46 states and the tobacco industry in November 1998. Four Tobacco Companies- Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown and Williamson, and Lorillard- agreed to compensate states for health care costs due to tobacco use by paying approximately \$240 Billion over an estimated 25 years. (Four states – Mississippi, Texas, Florida and Minnesota – reached earlier, individual settlements.) To see Colorado's Settlement History, see Fact Sheet 4.8 "Tobacco State Settlement: Colorado History"

The tobacco companies **also promised to stop targeting young people** by ending brand-name sponsorship of team sporting events, ending carton characters in advertising, and ending outdoor and transit advertising within 1,000 feet of any school. **States agreed to use the money they would receive from the settlement to fund tobacco prevention and cessation.** 

Sounds great, but is happening now??

In the current budget year, Fiscal 2006, the states combined have allocated \$551 million for tobacco prevention programs, while the tobacco companies are spending an estimated \$15.4 billion annually, or \$42 million a day, on marketing (tobacco marketing numbers are based on 2003 figures for cigarettes and 2001 figures for smokeless tobacco products, the most recent reported by the Federal Trade Commission, and are almost certainly much higher today). This means the tobacco companies spend at least \$28 to market tobacco products for every one dollar the states spend on tobacco prevention. The tobacco companies spend more on marketing in a single day than 47 states and the District of Columbia spend on tobacco prevention in an entire year.

A report, "A Broken Promise to Our Children: The 1998 State Tobacco Settlement Seven Years Later," was released by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, American Heart Association, American Cancer Society and American Lung Association and found that only four states — Maine, Colorado, Delaware and Mississippi — currently fund such programs at minimum levels recommended by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia fund programs at less than half the CDC's minimum level or provide no state funding at all.

The report cites evidence that the recent cuts in tobacco prevention funding are undermining efforts to reduce youth smoking. A CDC survey released in April found no significant declines in high school and middle school smoking rates between 2002 and 2004 after several years of major declines. The CDC attributed the lack of progress to the 28 percent cut in state tobacco prevention funding from 2002 to 2004 and steep increases in tobacco marketing.

From 1998, when they agreed to some marketing curbs as part of the tobacco settlement, to 2003, the tobacco companies increased their marketing spending by 123 percent to an estimated \$15.4 billion. One of the tobacco industry's most outrageous new tactics is the introduction of candy-flavored cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.

- R.J. Reynolds the same company that once marketed cigarettes to kids with a cartoon character, Joe Camel has launched a series of flavored cigarettes, including a pineapple and coconut-flavored cigarette called "Kauai Kolada" and a citrus-flavored cigarette called "Twista Lime." In November 2004, they introduced Camel "Winter Blends" in flavors including "Winter Warm Toffee" and "Winter MochaMint" (see Campaign statement).
- Brown & Williamson has introduced flavored versions of its Kool cigarettes with names like "Caribbean Chill," "Midnight Berry," "Mocha Taboo" and "Mintrigue."
- The U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company is marketing spit tobacco with flavors including berry blend, mint, wintergreen, apple blend, vanilla and cherry.

Brown & Williamson has also promoted its Kool cigarettes with hip-hop music themes and images that have particular appeal to African-American youth.

A Massachusetts Department of Health study found that cigarette advertising in magazines with high youth readership actually increased by 33% after the MSA. The study found that magazines ads for eight of the top ten cigarette brands reached 70% or more of kids at least five times in 1999.

The "A Broken Promise to Our Children: The 1998 State Tobacco Settlement Seven Years Later," report shows that the states' efforts to protect kids from tobacco have failed to keep up with the record growth in the tobacco industry's marketing of its deadly and addictive products," said William V. Corr, Executive Director of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. "States lack excuses for their failure to protect our children. We have mountains of evidence that prevention programs work to keep kids from smoking, save lives and save money by reducing tobacco-related health care costs. And the states are financially healthy again, in part because they are collecting record amounts of revenue from the tobacco settlement and tobacco taxes."

Use with Fact Sheet 4.8 "Tobacco State Settlement: Colorado History"

Source: Tobacco Free Kids, Press Release. Tobacco Companies Spend \$28 to Market Products For Every \$1 States Spend on Tobacco Prevention, Report Finds (November 30, 2005)



#### TOBACCO COMPANY MARKETING TO KIDS

The major cigarette companies, alone, now spend about \$15.1 billion per year (or more than \$41 million every day) to promote their products; and many of their marketing efforts directly reach kids. In fact, cigarette company spending to market their deadly products increased by almost 125 percent from 1998 to 2003 (the most recent year for which complete data is available) and partial data for 2004 show that these increases are continuing. Moreover, tobacco industry documents, research on the effect of the cigarette companies' marketing efforts on kids, and the opinions of advertising experts combine to reveal the intent and the success of the industry's efforts to attract new smokers from the ranks of children.

#### **Tobacco Industry Statements & Actions**

Numerous internal tobacco industry documents, revealed in the various tobacco lawsuits, show that the tobacco companies have perceived kids as young as 13 years of age as a key market, studied the smoking habits of kids, and developed products and marketing campaigns aimed at them.<sup>3</sup> As an RJR Tobacco document put it, "Many manufacturers have 'studied' the 14-20 market in hopes of uncovering the 'secret' of the instant popularity some brands enjoy to the almost exclusion of others. . . . Creating a 'fad' in this market can be a great bonanza."<sup>4</sup> The following are just a few of the many more internal company quotes about marketing to kids:

Philip Morris: "Today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer, and the

overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while still in their teens. . . The smoking patterns of teenagers are particularly important to

Philip Morris."5

RJ Reynolds: "Evidence is now available to indicate that the 14-18 year old group is an

increasing segment of the smoking population. RJR-T must soon establish a successful new brand in this market if our position in the

industry is to be maintained in the long term." 6

Brown & Williamson: "Kool's stake in the 16- to 25-year-old population segment is such that the

value of this audience should be accurately weighted and reflected in current media programs . . . all magazines will be reviewed to see how

efficiently they reach this group."7

Lorillard Tobacco: "[T]he base of our business is the high school student."8

U.S. Tobacco: "Cherry Skoal is for somebody who likes the taste of candy, if you know

what I'm saying."9

#### **Tobacco Companies Still Market Their Products to Kids**

The cigarette companies now claim that they have finally stopped <u>intentionally</u> marketing to kids or targeting youths in their research or promotional efforts. But they continue to advertise cigarettes in ways that reach vulnerable underage populations. For example, the cigarette and spit-tobacco companies continue to advertise heavily at retail outlets near schools and playgrounds, with large ads and signs clearly visible from outside the stores. In addition:

- A study in the New England Journal of Medicine found that the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement has had little effect on cigarette advertising in magazines. In 2000, the tobacco companies spent \$59.6 million in advertising expenditures for the most popular youth brands in youth oriented magazines. The settlement has not reduced youth exposure to advertisements for these brands. Magazine ads for each of the three most popular youth brands (Marlboro, Newport, and Camel) reached more than 80 percent of young people in the United States an average of 17 times in 2000.<sup>10</sup>
- Similarly, a Massachusetts Department of Health study found that cigarette advertising in magazines with high youth readership actually increased by 33% after the November, 1998 Master Settlement

Agreement, in which the tobacco companies agreed not to market to kids.<sup>11</sup> And an American Legacy Foundation study found that magazine ads for eight of the top ten cigarette brands reached 70 percent or more of kids five or more times in 1999.<sup>12</sup>

- In June of 2002, a California judge fined the R.J. Reynolds cigarette company for advertising in magazines with high youth readerships in ways that violated the state tobacco settlement agreement's prohibition that forbids the cigarette companies from taking any action directly or indirectly to target youth in the advertising, promotion, or marketing of tobacco products.<sup>13</sup>
- In July 2000, a study revealed that after tobacco billboards were banned by the Master Settlement Agreement the cigarette companies increased their advertising and promotions in and around retail outlets, such as convenience stores.<sup>14</sup>
- According to a study conducted by the Massachusetts Department of Health, United States Smokeless Tobacco Company (USST), the country's largest smokeless tobacco manufacturer, spent \$9.4 million advertising in magazines with high youth readership in 2001, compared to the average \$5.4 million spent in 1997 and 1998, the two years before the settlement. Nearly half of the company's advertising (45 percent) continued to be in youth-oriented magazines after the settlement.

At the same time, major cigarette companies vigorously oppose reasonable efforts to make it more difficult for kids to obtain cigarettes – such as raising tobacco excise taxes, eliminating cigarette vending machines in locations accessible by children, requiring that tobacco products be sold from behind the counter, forbidding sales of single cigarettes or "kiddie packs" (packs of fewer than 20 cigarettes), or prohibiting sales of cigarettes via the internet or through the mail.

In fact, the cigarette companies are addicted to underage smoking. Almost 90 percent of all regular smokers begin smoking at or before age 18, and hardly anybody tries their first cigarette outside of childhood. In other words, if kids stopped smoking, the cigarette companies market of smokers would shrink away to almost nothing. But thanks, in large part, to cigarette company marketing efforts, each day more than 4,000 kids try smoking for the first time, and another 2,000 kids become regular daily smokers.

#### **Empirical Evidence of the Impact of Tobacco Marketing to Kids**

Beyond the industry's own statements, there is compelling evidence that much of their advertising and promotion is directed at kids and successfully recruits new tobacco users. A 2002 monograph by the National Cancer Institute, which reviewed the research on tobacco advertising and promotion and its impact on youth smoking, found that tobacco advertising and promotional activities are important catalysts in the smoking initiation process. The NCI report also found, based on a review of the extant research, that "the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between tobacco marketing and smoking initiation seems unassailable." <sup>18</sup>

A number of studies have demonstrated the relationship between tobacco marketing and youth smoking behavior:

- 82 percent of youth (12-17) smokers prefer Marlboro, Camel and Newport three heavily advertised brands. Marlboro, the most heavily advertised brand, constitutes almost 50 percent of the youth market but only about 38 percent of smokers over age 25.<sup>19</sup>
- A study in the American Journal of Public Health showed that adolescents who owned a tobacco
  promotional item and named a cigarette brand whose advertising attracted their attention were twice
  as likely to become established smokers than those who did neither.<sup>20</sup>
- A survey released in March 2005 showed that kids were more than twice as likely as adults to recall tobacco advertising. While only 26 percent of all adults recalled seeing a tobacco ad in the two weeks prior to the survey, 56 percent of kids aged 12 to 17 reported seeing tobacco ads.<sup>21</sup>

- A 2002 study in the Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine found that receptivity to tobacco advertising had a significant impact on each step of the progression from non-smoking to established regular smoking, even when exposure to smoking in the home and by peers was controlled. The biggest impact was on influencing non-susceptible youth to becoming susceptible to smoking.<sup>22</sup>
- A study in the *Journal of the National Cancer Institute* found that teens are more likely to be influenced to smoke by cigarette advertising than they are by peer pressure.<sup>23</sup>
- A study in the *Journal of Marketing* found that teenagers are three times as sensitive as adults to cigarette advertising.<sup>24</sup>
- A longitudinal study of teenagers in the Journal of the American Medical Association showed that tobacco industry promotional activities influenced previously non-susceptible non-smokers to become susceptible to or experiment with smoking.<sup>25</sup>
- An American Journal of Preventive Medicine study found that youth who were highly receptive to
  tobacco advertising were 70 percent more likely to move from being experimental smokers to
  established smokers compared to those who had a minimal receptivity to tobacco advertising. The
  study also found that youth who believed that they could quit smoking anytime were almost twice as
  likely to become established smokers compared to those who did not think they could quit any time.<sup>26</sup>
- According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the development and marketing of "starter products" with such features as pouches and cherry flavoring have switched smokeless tobacco from a product used primarily by older men to one used mostly by young men.<sup>27</sup> More than 14 percent of high school boys are current smokeless tobacco users.<sup>28</sup>
- In the early 1990's, 30 percent of kids 12 to 17 years old, both smokers and nonsmokers, owned at least one tobacco-brand promotional item, such as T-shirts, backpacks, and CD players. 29
- Between 1989 and 1993, when advertising for the new Joe Camel campaign jumped from \$27 million to \$43 million, Camel's share among youth increased by more than 50 percent, while its adult market share did not change at all.<sup>30</sup>
- A report in the Journal of the American Medical Association documented a rapid and unprecedented increase in the smoking initiation rate of adolescent girls subsequent to the launch in the late 1960's of women's cigarette brands like Virginia Slims.<sup>31</sup>
- A December 1996 survey of advertising industry executives found that roughly 80 percent believed
  that advertising for cigarettes reaches children and teenagers in significant numbers and makes
  smoking more appealing or socially acceptable to kids. And 71 percent believed that tobacco
  advertising changes behavior and increases smoking among kids; and 59 percent believe that a goal
  of tobacco advertising is marketing cigarettes to teenagers who do not already smoke.<sup>32</sup>

As a commentator in the *Advertising Age* trade journal put it, "Cigarette people maintain peer pressure is the culprit in getting kids to start smoking and that advertising has little effect. That's like saying cosmetic ads have no effect on girls too young to put on lipstick."<sup>33</sup>

The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, August 9, 2005 / Meg Gallogly

#### **Related Campaign Fact Sheets**

[Available at http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/index.php?CategoryID=23]

- Tobacco Industry Continues to Market to Kids
- Cigarette Companies Cannot Survive Unless Kids Smoke
- Philip Morris & Targeting Kids
- Increased Cigarette Company Marketing Since the Multistate Settlement Agreement Went into Effect
- Allocations of Cigarette Company Marketing Expenditures (Table)
- Tobacco Company Marketing to College Students Since the MSA was Signed
- Tobacco Company Marketing that Reaches Kids: Point-of-Purchase Advertising and Promotions

- Racing to Addiction: Tobacco Company Auto Racing Sponsorships
- Research Findings on Tobacco Industry Marketing To Kids In Magazines
- Tobacco Product Marketing on the Internet
- Tobacco Company Quotes on Marketing to Kids
- A Long History of Empty Promises: The Cigarette Companies' Youth Anti-Smoking Programs
- <sup>1</sup> U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Cigarette Report for 2003, 2005 [data for top six manufacturers only] http://www.ftc.gov/reports/cigarette05/050809cigrpt.pdf. See, also, FTC, Federal Trade Commission Smokeless Tobacco Report for the Years 2000 and 2001, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/2k2k1smokeless.pdf, August 2003, [top five smokeless tobacco manufacturers spent more than \$236 million on marketing in 2001].
- See, e.g., Gordon Fairclough, "Corporate Focus R.J. Reynolds Lowers Forecasts -- Cigarette Price War, Generic Competition to Take Toll on Earnings," Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2002; the companies' periodic reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission at www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm; and Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids fact sheet, Increased Cigarette Company Marketing Since the Multistate Settlement Agreement Went into Effect, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0128.pdf.
- <sup>3</sup> See, also, Perry, C.L., "The Tobacco Industry and Underage Youth Smoking: Tobacco Industry Documents from the Minnesota Litigation," Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 153:935-941, September 1999.

<sup>4</sup> RJ Reynolds, "NFO Preference Share Data – 'Youth' Market," March 8, 1973.

- <sup>5</sup> Philip Morris, Special Report, "Young Smokers: Prevalence, Trends, Implications, and Related Demographic Trends," March 31, 1981, Bates No. Bates #1000390803, http://www.pmdocs.com.
- <sup>6</sup> RJ Reynolds, "Planned Assumptions and Forecast for the Period 1977-1986," March 15, 1976. Bates No. 502819513 -9532, http://www.rjrtdocs.com.
- <sup>7</sup> Brown & Williamson, Memo by RL Johnson, Brand Manager, to Executive Vice President Pittman, February 21, 1973. Bates No. 680135996, http://www.bw.aalatg.com/public.asp.
- <sup>8</sup> Lorillard, Memo from executive TL Achey to former Lorillard President Curtis Judge re Newport brand, August 30, 1978. Bates No. TINY0003062. http://www.tobaccoinstitute.com.
- <sup>9</sup> Freedman, A., "Juiced up: How a tobacco giant doctors snuff brands to boost their 'kick,'" Wall Street Journal; October 26, 1994 [quoting former UST sales representative].

  10 King, C & M. Siegel, "The Master Settlement Agreement with the Tobacco Industry and Cigarette Advertising in
- Magazines," New England Journal of Medicine 345(7): 504-511, August 16, 2001.
- Bowker, D & M Hamilton, "Cigarette Advertising Expenditures before and After the Master Settlement Agreement: Preliminary Findings." May 15, 2000, <a href="http://www.state.ma.us/dph/mtcp/report/mag.htm">http://www.state.ma.us/dph/mtcp/report/mag.htm</a>.

  12 "Tobacco Brand Magazine Advertising to Teens, " American Legacy Foundation, May 17, 2000.
- <sup>13</sup> Girion, L. and Levin. M., "R.J. Reynolds Fined for Ads Aimed at Teens: Tobacco: Judgement of \$20 million for magazine pitches is first financial penalty for violation of 1998 national settlement," *Los Angeles Times,* June 7, 2002. <sup>14</sup> Wakefield, Melanie, et al., "Changes at the point of purchase for tobacco following the 1999 tobacco billboard
- advertising ban." University of Illinois at Chicago. Research Paper Series, No. 4 July 2000.

  15 Massachusetts Department of Health, "Smokeless Tobacco Advertising Expenditures Before and After the Smokeless Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement," May 2002; http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/Script/DisplayPressRelease.php3?Display=503
- <sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report
- of The Surgeon General, 1994.

  17 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, (SAMHSA), HHS, Results from the 2003 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, NSDUH: Detailed Tables.
- http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/2k3TabsCover.pdf

  18 National Cancer Institute, *Changing Adolescent Smoking Prevalence*, Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph No.14, NH Pub. No. 02-5086, November 2001.
- <sup>19</sup> SAMHSA, HHS, Results from the 2003 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, NSDUH: Detailed Tables. http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/2k3TabsCover.pdf
- <sup>20</sup> Biener, L. and M. Siegel, "Tobacco Marketing and Adolescent Smoking; More Support for a Causal Inference," American Journal of Public Health 90(3): 407-411 (March 2000).
- "National telephone survey of 500 teens aged 12 to 17 and 1,011 adults conducted by International Communications Research (ICR), March 16-20, 2005.
- <sup>22</sup> Kaufman, N., et al., "Predictors of Change on the Smoking Uptake Continuum Among Adolescents," Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, 156: 581-587 (June 2002).

  <sup>23</sup> Evans, N., et al., "Influence of Tobacco Marketing and Exposure to Smokers on Adolescent Susceptibility to
- Smoking," *Journal of the National Cancer Institute* 87(20): 1538-45 (October 1995). <sup>24</sup> Pollay et al., "The Last Straw? Cigarette Advertising and Realized Market Shares Among Youth and Adults,"
- Journal of Marketing 60(2):1-16 (April 1996).
  <sup>25</sup> Pierce, J. et al, "Tobacco Industry Promotion of Cigarettes and Adolescent Smoking," Journal of the American
- Medical Association 279(7): 511-505 (February 1998) [with erratum in JAMA 280(5): 422 (August 1998)].

Preventive Medicine, 22(4):228-233 (2002).

27 CDC, "Surveillance for Selected Tobacco-Use Behaviors – United States, 1900-1994." MMWR 43(SS-3) (November 18, 1994). <sup>28</sup> CDC, "Trends in Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students - United States, 1991-2001,"

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5119a1.htm, *MMWR* 51(19), May 17, 2002.

<sup>29</sup> Gallup International Institute, "Teen-age Attitudes and Behaviors Concerning Tobacco" (September, 1992).

<sup>30</sup> CDC, "Changes in the Cigarette Brand Preference of Adolescent Smokers, U.S. 1989-1993," *MMWR*, (August,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Choi, W, et al., "Progression to Established Smoking, The Influence of Tobacco Marketing," American Journal of

<sup>1994).

31</sup> Pierce, J, et al., "Smoking Initiation by Adolescent Girls, 1944 Through 1988," *JAMA*, 271(8): 608-611 (1994). Telephone survey of 300 advertising executives in agencies with billings of more than \$10 million, commissioned by the New York advertising firm of Shepardson, Stern, and Kaminsky (December 1996).

33 Rance Crain, *Advertising Age*, October 20, 1995.



#### PHILIP MORRIS AND TARGETING KIDS

The Philip Morris cigarette company is trying to persuade the public that it is a good corporate citizen, despite its deadly product. The company has said it is spending roughly \$100 million per year on a campaign to improve its corporate image, and another \$100 million on a directly related campaign (including television ads) that purports to combat teen smoking. Philip Morris has also been seeking new "anti-youth-smoking" partnerships with youth service organizations, state school systems, and major universities. But recent research and internal Philip Morris documents disclosed in the tobacco lawsuits indicate that the company's efforts are designed to generate much-needed positive publicity for the company rather than actually reduce youth smoking.

#### **The Current Situation**

Philip Morris's Marlboro brand is the most popular brand among kids, accounting for almost half of the underage market.<sup>1</sup> That means that roughly 2,000 kids become Marlboro smokers every day, with more than 600 of them likely to die prematurely because of their smoking.<sup>2</sup> To look at it another way, if current trends continue roughly five million kids alive today will die from smoking -- and about three million of them will have started their smoking habit with Marlboro cigarettes.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. cigarette companies spend roughly \$15.1 billion to promote their cigarettes each year. Philip Morris, which controls almost 50 percent of the total U.S. cigarette market, is responsible for the lion's share of that spending. Marlboro is the most heavily advertised brand in the United States.

Bowing to pressure from state attorney general, Philip Morris has suspended its advertising in magazines with large youth audiences -- temporarily. But Philip Morris still advertises heavily at retail outlets, including externally visible cigarette ads at stores near schools and playgrounds. The company has also opposed measures that would make it much harder for kids to obtain cigarettes but not significantly inconvenience any adult smokers -- such as the original FDA tobacco rule's youth-focused marketing restrictions (which were blocked by legal challenges by Philip Morris and other tobacco companies) or the current legislative proposals to reestablish the rule. And Philip Morris has failed to take any steps to stop the internet sales of its brands that do not have adequate safeguards to block sales to kids.

#### Philip Morris's Anti-Youth-Smoking Television Ads

A 1999 study found that Philip Morris's anti-youth-smoking ads were less effective than those already being used in California, Massachusetts, Arizona and Florida in those states' tobacco prevention programs. More specifically, the study found that:

- Ads that graphically, dramatically, and emotionally portray the serious negative consequences of smoking were consistently rated highest by respondents in terms of making them "stop and think about not using tobacco." But the Philip Morris ads said little or nothing about negative health consequences from smoking.
- Ads that focused on the "choice" theme (i.e., be yourself, you can choose whether to smoke), such as those run by Philip Morris, were consistently rated lowest.

If Philip Morris really wanted to reduce youth smoking, it is clear that the company could spend the millions of dollars it has allocated to anti-youth-smoking efforts more effectively. But that is not surprising given Philip Morris's history of marketing to kids and ineffectual "anti-youth-smoking" initiatives.

#### What Philip Morris Says In Public

We don't want kids to smoke. We're intensifying our efforts that we started a number of years ago by launching this new smoking-intervention initiative, starting with these ads. [Michael E. Szymanczyk, president of Philip Morris USA, New York Times, December 3, 1998.]

In all my years at Philip Morris, I've never heard anyone talk about marketing to youth. [Geoffrey Bible, CEO of Philip Morris, Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune, March 4, 1998.]

#### What They Say In Private: Marketing to Kids

Marlboro's phenomenal growth rate in the past has been attributable in large part to our high market penetration among young smokers . . .15 to 19 years old . . . my own data, which includes younger teenagers, shows even higher Marlboro market penetration among 15-17-year-olds. [Philip Morris Document #1000024921/4927, May 21, 1975]

[To support Marlboro's growth, Marlboro must] continue growth among new, young smokers...While Marlboro continues to attract increasing shares of young smokers, expected declines in the number of young people restrict future volume gains from this source.

[PM Doc. #2043440057/0112, 1985]

Because of our high share of the market among the youngest smokers, Philip Morris will suffer more than the other companies from the decline in the number of teenage smokers. [PM Doc. #1000390803/0855, March 31, 1981]

[T]he success of Marlboro Red during its most rapid growth period was because it became the brand of choice among teenagers who then stuck with it as they grew older. [Special Report, "Young Smokers: Prevalence, Trends, Implications, and Related Demographic Trends," PM Doc. #1000390803/55, March 31, 1981]

Thus, the ability to attract new smokers and develop them into a young adult franchise is key to brand development. [PM Doc. #2044895379/484, 1992]

#### What They Say In Private: Behavioral Research About Kids

It is important to know as much as possible about teenage smoking patterns and attitudes. Today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while in their teens . . . it is during the teenage years that the initial brand choice is made. [Special Report, "Young Smokers: Prevalence, Trends, Implications, and Related Demographic Trends," PM Document #1000390803/55, March 31, 1981]

We wonder whether such children may not eventually become cigarette smokers in their teenage years as they discover the advantage of self-stimulation via nicotine. We have already collaborated with a local school system in identifying some such children in the third grade. . . Report on study of hyperactive children. [PM Doc. #1003288122, June 10, 1974]

A Philip Morris Marketing Research Department document highlights that within a "probability sample of 452 teen-agers ages 12-17" 13 percent smoke an average of 10.6 cigarettes per day and that "the data from the study are consonant with the findings of other such studies, both at Philip Morris and without." [PM Doc. #2041761791, May 18, 1973]

As the preceding quotes demonstrate, Philip Morris has targeted kids as customers and done extensive research on youth smoking and related behaviors. In fact, Philip Morris's Senior Vice President of Youth Smoking Prevention who is in charge of the company's \$100 million anti-youth smoking campaign, Dr. Carolyn Levy, previously worked in the Philip Morris research department on studies on nicotine effects and smoking behaviors. Br. Levy was also one of two Philip Morris researchers who formally approved the previously quoted special report that stated "Today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer."

#### What They Say In Private: Anti-Youth Smoking As A Public Relations Ploy

If we don't do something fast to project the sense of industry responsibility regarding the youth access issue, we are going to be looking at severe marketing restrictions in a very short time. Those restrictions will pave the way for equally severe legislation or regulation on where adults are allowed to smoke.

[Philip Morris, "JJM to PM Invitational – Importance of Youth Issue," PM Doc.#2044046016, February 9, 1995.

The youth [anti-smoking] program and its individual parts support The [Tobacco] Institute's objective of discouraging . . . federal, state, and local restrictions on cigarette advertising. [Tobacco Institute "Discussion Paper," Doc. #TIMN0164422/4424, January 29, 1991]

[If Philip Morris took] a more progressive position on tobacco, it would enable the company to move onto a higher moral playing field, to neutralize the tobacco issue and to focus attention on other, more appealing products. [PM Doc. #2023586677, December 3, 1992]

It seems to me our objective is . . . a 'media event' which in itself promises a lot but produces little. [Tobacco Institute memo from Executive Vice President Franklin Dryden recommending a "pre-adult education" program, 1979 Document Number TIMN0065288]

#### The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, August 9, 2005 / Meg Gallogly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, (SAMHSA), HHS, Results from the 2003 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, NSDUH: Detailed Tables. <a href="http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/2k3TabsCover.pdf">http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/2k3TabsCover.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), "Incidence of Initiation of Cigarette Smoking – United States 1965-1996," *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)* 47(39): 837-40 (October 9, 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> CDC, "Projected Smoking-Related Deaths Among Youths – USA, MMWR 45(44): 971-974 (November 8, 1996).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), *Cigarette Report for 2003*, 2005 [data for top six manufacturers only] <a href="http://www.ftc.gov/reports/cigarette05/050809cigrpt.pdf">http://www.ftc.gov/reports/cigarette05/050809cigrpt.pdf</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> "Leading National Advertisers," Advertising Age (September 28, 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See e.g., Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids fact sheet, Supreme Court FDA Ruling, www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Teenage Research Unlimited, Counter-Tobacco Advertising Exploratory Summary Report January – March, 1999 (March 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Philip Morris Memorandum, "Smoker Psychology" (PM Doc. #1003293097).



#### TOBACCO INDUSTRY TARGETING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS

The tobacco companies have long understood the importance of women and girls in the overall market for cigarettes and as a source of new customers. They have conducted extensive market research on the attitudes of women and girls to better understand how to target their products and their advertising. By focusing their research on how females view themselves, their aspirations and the social pressures they face, the cigarette companies have developed some of the most aggressive and sophisticated marketing campaigns in history for reaching and influencing women and girls. The consequences of these campaigns are staggering. Smoking among girls and young women increased dramatically in the 1990s. More than one out of every four high school girls is a current smoker (27.7%). Smoking rates among women over 18 have barely declined over the past 10 years and women are now almost as likely as men to smoke.

#### The Early Years

Though the slogans have changed over time, the tobacco industry's targeted marketing of women can be traced back to the 1920s. While women were depicted in cigarette ads as non-smoking admirers of smoking men at first, by 1927 advertisements with women smoking began to appear in women's magazines.<sup>3</sup> One of the most famous early cigarette advertising campaigns directed at women was Lucky Strikes' "Reach for A Lucky Instead of A Sweet."

Despite the advent of targeted advertising, smoking among women did not really gain social acceptability until World War II. During that era, cigarette companies began to target women more directly, using the fashion, beauty, and sophistication themes that still continue today. The companies also used images of women in the military and the work place. For example, Camel's ad slogan during World War II was "First in the Service" and highlighted successful women in the military. While these new advertising campaigns focused on women's growing role in the American workplace, they still portrayed smoking as a stylish and feminine act. This theme of smoking as a way of achieving independence, while at the same time remaining stylish and attractive (especially to men), became less popular after the war ended, but would later reappear.

#### The Advent of Women-Specific Brands in the 1970s

Cigarette company advertising continued to target women throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but the companies did not make a full-scale effort to expand the number of their female customers until the late 1960s. Realizing the impact that the women's liberation movement was having on the role of women in America, the tobacco companies began to create specific brands of cigarettes for women.

With the introduction of Virginia Slims by Philip Morris in 1968, women became a major target of the tobacco industry. Cigarette ads for this brand depicted women as independent and successful with catchy tag lines such as the infamous "You've Come A Long Way Baby." Like early ads targeted at women, these marketing efforts continued to portray female smoking as a way to express one's independence, as well as a way to be particularly stylish and sexy.

The Virginia Slims advertising theme has not changed much since its introduction. Philip Morris continued to market Virginia Slims using images of empowered women paired with "You've Come A Long Way Baby" throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The copy on these ads usually focused on how women's lives had changed since the 1920s and 1930s, focusing on the new freedoms allowed to women. In the early 1990s, Philip Morris revamped the image of Virginia Slims with the "It's a Woman Thing" campaign. While these ad campaigns continued to suggest empowerment and attractiveness from smoking, the ad copy focused on how women are different than men. More recently, Virginia Slims launched the lavish "Find Your Voice" ad campaign, which featured strikingly beautiful women from around the world and suggested that independence and allure could be found by smoking. (Philip Morris' chief executive in June 2000 agreed to remove the "Find Your Voice" slogan after being questioned in the landmark Florida smokers trial about whether it might be offensive to smokers with throat cancer.)

With the success of these marketing campaigns, the tobacco companies fully recognized the importance of women and girls as a key to their future success. For example, an internal R.J. Reynolds document stated that "Younger adult female smokers will continue to gain importance among [young adult] smokers due to their stronger incidence trend versus [young adult] male smokers." Six years after the introduction of Virginia Slims and other brands aimed at the female market, the smoking initiation rate of 12-year-old girls had increased by 110 percent. Increases among teenage girls of other ages were also substantial.

In the 1990s, the tobacco industry started tying their print advertising campaigns to a variety of promotional campaigns. These campaigns reinforced the image of smoking being stylish and sexy by offering free merchandise like clothing and CDs. Studies have shown that there is a direct relationship between the awareness of and involvement with promotional items and smoking initiation by youth.<sup>7</sup>

#### Targeting Women with "Low Tar" and "Light" Cigarettes

Realizing that many women were concerned about the long-term health risks of smoking, in the 1970s the tobacco companies began promoting "low tar" or "light" cigarettes to women as a "softer" or even "safer" option. As a 1978 Philip Morris document stated, "Today women make up the majority of low tar smokers. Almost half of all women have switched to low tar."

Almost a decade later, another Philip Morris document offered a more detailed analysis, stating that "because of women's nurturing role in society, they are naturally more involved with low tar cigarettes than men (70% of low tar smokers are female). They do not want to stop smoking, yet they are guilt-ridden with concerns for their families if smoking should badly damage their own health. Thus they compromise by smoking low tar cigarettes. ... This new product can fit this positioning exactly." <sup>9</sup>

An example of this marketing strategy can be seen in the True ad campaign from the 1970s. This campaign, which showed golfers and tennis players as well as young women, read "All the fuss about smoking got me thinking I'd either quit or smoke True. I smoke True. The low tar low nicotine cigarette. Think about it."

The cigarette companies continued to market these products despite being well aware that the actual or implied health claims in their ads were either misleading or entirely false. In fact, studies have shown that the introduction of "lights" did not improve the public health and may have led to an increase in the incidence of disease caused by smoking. That is because the introduction of lights led many smokers not to quit and smokers of lights compensate by smoking more, inhaling more deeply or blocking ventilation holes.<sup>10</sup>

More women then men currently smoke light and ultra-light cigarettes (63 percent of women and 46 percent of men). Women are also more likely than men to switch to light or ultra-light cigarettes. 1112

#### Cigarette Company Targeting of Women and Girls Today

The cigarette companies continue to target women using the same themes in their advertising. The image of smoking being tied to independence, stylishness, weight control, sophistication and power continues today in the advertisements running in many popular women's magazines. There are now two main types of cigarettes marketed to women, female brands and dual sex brands. Female brands, like Virginia Slims, Capri and Misty, are marketed directly to women using feminine images. Dual sex brands, like Marlboro and Camel, are marketed to women with independent and fun-loving imagery.

Philip Morris has been especially successful in its efforts to attract women to its "dual sex" brands. For years now, more women, of all age groups, have smoked Marlboro than any other brand. As an RJR document recognized, "It is clear that the primary competitor for a new [young adult] female smoker is Marlboro. An undated R.J. Reynolds analysis of younger adult female smokers recognized the importance of this group to industry growth and also the potential in 'dual sex' brands like Marlboro and Camel: "Most younger adult females smoke a dual sex brand – not too masculine (e.g. Camel), but not strictly female (Virginia Slims). While specially targeted female brands will undoubtedly play a role in the

future market, lifestyle trends suggest that commonalities between younger adult males/females are increasing over time, so that dual sex wants are likely to remain prevalent."<sup>15</sup>

Female-specific brands continue to play an important role in the cigarette companies' marketing strategies. Recent female-brand marketing campaigns continue to portray the image that women are empowered by smoking and Virginia Slims continues to be the most popular female specific brand among women.<sup>16</sup>

From the Camel ads of the forties, with images of female pilots and copy lines like "They've Got What it Takes!," to the recent Virginia Slims campaign telling women to "Find Your Voice," the tobacco companies have continued to target women and girls with their deadly and addictive product. In the United States, smoking rates among males and females in high school are almost equal (34.7 for males and 34.9 for females), and more than 20 percent of adult women are current smokers.<sup>17</sup>

The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, May 31, 2002

#### **Additional Tobacco Industry Quotes About Targeting Women and Girls**

**R.J. Reynolds, 1982.** "RJR has a corporate gap in the younger adult female smoker market. While this in itself does not represent a market opportunity, penetration of this smoker group does pose a strategic corporate opportunity ... younger adult smokers are strategically important to RJR's long-term growth ... Specifically, these young adult females agree that smoking is: attractive to the opposite sex, sophisticated/stylish, less intelligent, more aggressive, more mature, less feminine, smoke because friends do, feel more comfortable around others, feel that I'm rebelling."

*American Tobacco Company (later purchased by Brown and Williamson) 1983.* "Only recently has Virginia Slims attempted to update their approach reflecting fun and lifestyle. Given the increasing number of women in the work force, their demanding life-styles and changing values, an opportunity exists to position a female brand in step with today's successful women's lifestyle and values." 19

- **R.J. Reynolds, 1983.** "There is greater agreement as to how and why women began smoking in the first place. Beyond the easily recognized pressure of peers, women some to indicate passage into adulthood and as part of this transitional period, to exhibit anti-authoritarian behavior."<sup>20</sup>
- **R.J. Reynolds, 1983.** "The 'premise' is described as: "A brand that enhances/complements the young adult female smoker's image by standing for contemporary femininity."<sup>21</sup>
- **R.J. Reynolds, 1984.** "Designed to reinforce its appeal to fashion conscious, younger adult women ... These product and packaging modifications will allow the consumer to make a bolder statement about her lifestyle and still enjoy the low tar benefits of MORE lights 100's."<sup>22</sup>

*Philip Morris, 1985.* "However, this report does provide us with some useful information for Virginia Slims in a sense that a slim image cigarette has to be more of an appeal for the female smokers who are concerned about their weight. Although the survey indicated that only 52% of all female smokers 18-20 years old are concerned about their weight, I believe that this concern will be much higher amongst the over 20 year old female smokers, which is presumably the correct target for Virginia Slims. "<sup>23</sup>

**Philip Morris, 1991.** "VSLM Creative Strategy: To convince fashionable, modern, independent and self-confident women aged 20-34 that by smoking VSLM, they are making better/more complete expression of their independence."

**Philip Morris, 1992.** "In an effort to gain relevancy among young adult female smokers, Virginia Slims is exploring a new advertising direction. While this new direction has not been specifically defined as of yet, its objective is to make Virginia Slims relevant to young adult female smokers through a proprietary attitude, in the context of female style ... To women smokers, Virginia Slims is the brand that best expresses their style and attitude about being a women today. The Virginia Slims Fashion program should dimensionalize the style and attitude of today's young women smoker ... Event Objectives: generate trial and retrial among target ... provide YAFS with an opportunity to support a popular, relevant charitable cause."

American Tobacco Company (later purchased by Brown and Williamson) 1993. "There is significant opportunity to segment the female market on the basis of current values, age, lifestyles and preferred length and circumference

of products. This assignment should consider a more contemporary and relevant lifestyle approach targeted toward young adult female smokers."<sup>26</sup>

**Philip Morris, 1993.** "As a matter of fact, advertisements in magazines is the most efficient way to talk to these female smokers. We also know what values to outline based on what we just saw ... Actually, one of their main terminal values is to look attractive. In other words, a woman cannot be attractive if she is fat. Aerobics (gym) is therefore one of their major activities, when they do not try to meet the opposite sex in parties, bars or discotheques. This is their conception of having an exciting life for the time being. The feed back effect of such an exciting life and such as independence is that they claim it would be a long time before they settle down with someone. This boiling mixture of dreams, immediate experience of independence and intensive sexual encounters is satisfied in some ways by the brands they smoke. "27

**Philip Morris, 1993.** "As it is often the case, being stylish implies to hold the weight down and to remain physically fit. Not surprisingly, the people to look up to as models are sexy and self assure people and consists at least of socializing with sophisticated friends." <sup>28</sup>

**Brown and Williamson, 1995.** "The recent BrandScape research identified key characteristics of Misty smokers. Summed up into two words, the Misty smoker is both "Savvy" and "Sassy"; Savvy - rational, practical, feminine, price conscious. Sassy - active, youthful attitude, confident. This type of information has allowed us to fine-tune Misty's magazine selection, going beyond traditional quantitative data, age, income to include more qualitative insight into who the Misty focus audience is."<sup>29</sup>

**Brown and Williamson, 1995.** "Role of Print: Reach - Misty target is a heavy magazine reader ... Image - Vast array of editorial formats (i.e.: service, beauty, fashion, entertainment) provide Misty advertising with numerous 'personalities' increasing relevancy and interest to broad scope of Misty target ... Beauty / Fashion: Allure, Bazaar, Elle, Glamour, Mademoiselle, Mirabella, Vogue. Strong composition of younger portion of Misty target, editorial focus appeals to the sociability of the Misty smoker, ideal format to showcase creative."<sup>30</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), "Trends in Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students - United States, 1991-2001," *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)* 51(19), May 17, 2002. <a href="http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5119a1.htm">http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5119a1.htm</a>. <sup>2</sup> U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). "Cigarette Smoking Among Adults – United States, 1999," *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)*, 2001, Vol. 50, No. 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ernster, Virginia, "Mixed Messages for Women" New York State Journal of Medicine, July 1985.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Fairclough, G, "Philip Morris Removes Slogan From Ads In Second Attempt Responding To Critics," Wall Street Journal, 12 June 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> R.j. reynolds, Younger Adult Female Smokers - New Brand Opportunity, 23 July 1985 (RJR 504103122 -3124).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Pierce J.P., Lee L., Gilpin E.A., "Smoking initiation by adolescent girls, 1944 through 1988: An association with targeted advertising," *JAMA*, 1994, Vol. 271, No. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Pierce, J. et al, "Tobacco Industry Promotion of Cigarettes and Adolescent Smoking," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 1998 February; 279(7): 511-505. [with erratum in *JAMA* 280(5): 422 (August 1998)]. and Altman, DG. et al, "Tobacco Promotion and Susceptibility to Tobacco Use Among Adolescents aged 12 through 17," *American Journal of Public Health*. 1996 Nov; 86(11):1590-1593

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Philip Morris, Virginia Slims introduces the low tar cigarette made just for women, 1978 (PM 1005064182).

<sup>9</sup> Philip Morris, Project Magic, June 1985. (PM 2501008130).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Stellman, S.D., et al., "Risk of Squamous Cell Carcinoma and Adenocarcinoma of the Lung in Relation to Lifetime Filter Cigarette Smoking," *Cancer* August 1997; 80(3): 382-88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Pillitteri, JL, Shiffman S, Rohay JM, Gitchell JG, Burton SL. Smokers beliefs about light and ultralight cigarettes are more fiction than fact. Poster presented at the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco's Annual Meeting,

March 23, 2001, Seattle, Washington; and Pillitteri, JL, et al., Smokers beliefs about light and ultralight cigarettes," 2001; *Tobacco Control* 10(Suppll):i17-i23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Giovino, G. et al., "Attitudes, Knowledge, and Beliefs About Low-yield Cigarettes Among Adolescents and Adults," in *The FTC Cigarette Test Method for Determining Tar, Nicotine, and Carbon Monoxide Yields of U.S. Cigarettes; Report of the NCI Expert Committee.* National Institutes of Health. National Cancer Institute. Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 1999 CAI.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> R.J. Reynolds, Younger Adult Female Smokers - New Brand Opportunity, 23 July 1985 (RJR 504103122 -3124).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> R.J. Reynolds, Younger Adult Female Smokers, undated (RJR 503049112 -9115).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 1999 CAI.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance – United States, 1999," *MMWR*, 9 June 2000, Vol. 49, No. SS-5 and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). "Cigarette Smoking Among Adults – United States, 1999," *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)*, 2001, Vol. 50, No. 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> R.J. Reynolds, Analysis of 18-24 year old female market, 7 May 1982. (RJR, 502765848).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> American Tobacco Company, 1983 November 17. (B&W/ATC, ATX040017950-ATX040017951).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> R.J. Reynolds, McCann-Erickson market research dept, Two Focussed Group Sessions to Explore Attitudes Toward Smoking and Cigarette Brands/Advertising, November 1983. (RJR, 501759283-9314).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> R.J. Reynolds, Project AA Analysis of Female Smokers, July 19, 1983 (RJR, 501759283-9314)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> R.J. Reynolds, June 14, 1984 (RJR, 500627236-7337)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Philip Morris, Virginia Slims Memo, 8 August 1985. (PM 2026305099).

Philip Morris, VSLM Print Advertising Test, 5 April 1991. (PM 2504059015/9081).
 Philip Morris, Request for Promotional Services, 31 March 1992. (PM 2043524894)
 American Tobacco Company, 1993 November 17. (B&W/ATC, ATX040017950-ATX040017951).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Philip Morris, Research Report on YAMS/YAFS, 1993 (PM 2040885023)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Philip Morris, Research Report YAMS/YAFS, 1993 (PM 2040885023)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Brown and Williamson, B&W Misty Media Plan Recommendation, 3 March 1995. (B&W 432010732).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>30 Brown and Williamson, B&W Misty Media Plan Recommendation, 3 March 1995. (B&W 432010732).

# Products Owned By Philip Morris Tobacco Company (according to their 2001 Annual Report)





**Desserts** 































**Cereals** 













# **Mock Trial**

**Time**: 2-3 class periods

<u>Materials</u>: A gavel, Where is the Food and Drug Administration, Tobacco State Settlement, Colorado History, U.S. Industry Marketing Graph, Who is Altria?, Big Victory for Altria.

<u>Objective:</u> Put tobacco on trial! Included are two examples of Mock Trials. It might be fun to collaborate with multiple grades.

# **MOCK TRIAL: Youth vs. The Tobacco Industry**

Read the following case and assign the class to conduct a trial. Make sure every student has a copy of the articles listed under materials.

Thomas Fairwether, from Seattle, Washington, has been a smoker fro the last fifty years. He began smoking at the age of twelve and has tried to quit many times without success. Now, at the age of 62, Mr. Fairweather, is facing many medical problems. He has had his larynx removed, due to cancer. He has emphysema that continues to worsen. He has had bouts with colon cancer and stomach cancer. His doctors, and available medical evidence, believe that all his medical problems are due to his smoking. Unfortunately, Mr. Fairweather is not able to quit smoking, die to the addictive nature of cigarettes.

Mr. Fairweather has taken the marker of his cigarettes, Tobacco, Inc., to court in order to finance the medical treatments that his insurance will no longer cover, as well as for the pain and suffering he and his family have been through. The lower court has determined that Tobacco, Inc. is liable for damages in the amount of 10 million dollars to compensate Mr. Fairweather for medical expenses and suffering. Tobacco, Inc. has appealed this ruling to your court because they feel Mr. Fairweather is responsible for his own behavior. They believe that this ruling will prompt every smoker to sue tobacco companies.

For the purposes of this exercise, we will be conducting a moot appellate court. In an appellate court, no witnesses are used and no new evidence may be presented. The attorneys for both sides will present their oral arguments before the judges.

The court will consist of a panel of justices. One will be a Chief Justice. There will be a team of attorneys for the petition and one for the respondent. The remainder of the class can be observers or reporters for the TV station or local newspapers.

## Roles and Responsibilities

At any time the judges may question the attorneys about the case. The Chief Justice will maintain the order of the court, extend the time limit for attorneys if requested, set down the rules of the court, and assign judges to write the majority and dissenting opinions. Judges may express their opinion about the case; they may also try to convince the other judges to side with them.

The attorneys must try to defend their side. The petitioner's attorney should show why the client's treatment was in error, and how that treatment violated the Constitution or state statute. Previous court decisions may be used to back up presentation.

Respondent's attorneys must try to present arguments that best represent their client's position. Previous court decisions may be used to back up presentation. Both sides should discuss the facts of the case.

### **Preparation**

Each team of attorneys will be given time to prepare their cases. They should research all material dealing with the case.

Each side of the case (petitioner and respondent) will have 20 minutes to present their arguments; 10 minutes can then be used for rebuttal and debate. It will go as follows

**20 minutes**: Petitioners must present their cases using the case outline provided, their research, and their formal arguments. Every attorney on the team must present.

**10 minutes**: The respondents may rebut any of the petitioners' arguments, to which the petitioners may respond.

**20 minutes**: Respondents must present their cases.

**10 minutes**. The petitioners may rebut any of the respondents arguments, to which the respondents may respond.

The Justices will ask any final questions and the deliberate. Justices will present their response and decision.

The judges will then meet and deliberate on the case. This may be done in private or in front of the class. If the deliberation is in front of the class, the judges will be the only ones allowed to speak.

After the deliberation the Chief Justice will give the opinion. The Chief Justice will assign justices to write a majority and minority opinion which will be read the to class later.



### WHERE IS THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA)?

Imagine if a new, consumable product was introduced that contained arsenic, formaldehyde and ammonia, and it was marketed to our children, but federal law wouldn't let the government do anything about it.

Unfortunately, such a product already exists - cigarettes. And unfortunately, the second part of the story is also true - under current law, the federal government cannot take action to reduce or eliminate the dangerous chemicals in cigarettes or any other tobacco product, or restrict their marketing and sale to kids. **The U.S. Supreme Court in March 2000 ruled that the FDA does not have authority to regulate tobacco products.** Any other product you legally eat, drink, or put in your body must show a list of ingredients. Congress can end this special protection for Big Tobacco by passing legislation to give the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products, as it does other consumer products.

Right now, the FDA can regulate a box of macaroni and cheese, but not a pack of cigarettes. The public health community supports strong, identical, bipartisan bills that have been introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives:

- •S. 666 sponsored by Senators Mike DeWine (R-OH) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA).
- •H.R. 1376 sponsored by Representatives Tom Davis (R-VA) and Henry Waxman (D-CA).

These bills will protect kids and save lives by granting the FDA authority to:

- •Restrict tobacco advertising and promotions, especially to children.
- •Stop illegal sales of tobacco products to children.
- •Ban candy-flavored cigarettes.
- •Require changes in tobacco products, such as the reduction of elimination of harmful chemicals, to make them less harmful or less addictive.
- •Prohibit health claims about so-called "reduced risk" products that are not scientifically proven or that would discourage current tobacco users from quitting or encourage new users to start.
- •Require disclosure of the contents of tobacco products and tobacco industry research about the health effects of their products.
- •Require larger and more informative health warnings on tobacco products.
- •Prohibit terms such as "light", "mild" and "low-tar" that have mislead consumers into believing that certain cigarettes are safer than others.

The tobacco industry made nearly \$2.8 Million in political contributions to federal candidates, political parties, and political committees in the 2003-2004 election cycle. Of those in Congress who voted against FDA regulation of tobacco products, they averaged \$27,255 annually in donations from the tobacco industry political committee from 1999-2004.

In 2004, Congress came closer than ever to enacting this legislation into law when the Senate twice approved it by overwhelming margins. Every day Congress fails to act, another 1,200 Americans die from tobacco use and another 2,000 kids become addicted.

"Factsheet: Why We Need FDA Regulation of Tobacco: It's Time to End Special Protection For the Tobacco Industry" *Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids*, 2005.

4.8

# **Tobacco State Settlement: Colorado History**

Updated: November 30, 2005

	FY2006	FY2005
Spending on Tobacco Prevention	\$27.00 million	\$4.30 million
% of CDC Recommended Minimum	109.98%	17.52%
Rank Among States (1-51)	2	34

Tobacco Generated Revenue (FY2005)

\$288.40 million

CDC Recommended Minimum Spending on Tobacco Prevention

\$24.55 million

Actual Spending on Tobacco Prevention (FY2005)

\$27.00 million

**Summary:** The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends that the state of Colorado spend between \$24.5 million and \$63.3 million a year to have an effective, comprehensive tobacco prevention program. Colorado currently allocates \$27 million a year for tobacco prevention. This is within the CDC's recommended guidelines and ranks Colorado 2nd among the states in the funding of tobacco prevention programs. Colorado's spending on tobacco prevention amounts to 9.4% of the \$288.4 million in tobacco-generated revenue the state collects each year in tobacco settlement payments and tobacco taxes.

**Current Status:** In November 2004, Colorado voters approved a 64-cent per pack increase in the state cigarette tax by a margin of 61 percent to 39 percent. The initiative earmarked the revenue for health initiatives, including \$24 million to \$28 million each year for tobacco prevention – enough to bring Colorado to the CDC-recommended minimum funding level.

In April 2005, Colorado's elected leaders and the Citizens for Healthier Colorado, which championed the cigarette tax increase, reached agreement on its implementation, including providing \$27 million a year to fund a comprehensive tobacco prevention and cessation program at CDC-recommended levels. As a result, tobacco settlement funds will no longer be used to fund the tobacco prevention and cessation programs.

The remainder of the \$170 million the tax is expected to generate annually will be used to expand healthcare coverage for the un- and under-insured and provide funding for prevention, detection and treatment services for heart and lung diseases and cancer.

**Background:** Prior to the 2005 agreement on allocating the new cigarette tax revenue, Colorado's tobacco settlement funds were governed by a 2000 law passed by the Legislature and signed by Governor Bill Owens (R). The law originally called for using 15 percent of the settlement funds, up to \$15 million a year, to fund Colorado's Tobacco Prevention and Cessation program. During the 2003 legislative session, Governor Owens and the Legislature cut both FY2003 and FY2004 funding for tobacco prevention to help address a budget shortfall.

The 2000 law placed about 38 percent of the state's annual settlement payments in a Health Trust Fund, with the goal of generating interest revenue to fund programs supported the trust fund, including tobacco prevention. Remaining funds were to be spent on a literacy program, tobacco prevention, the CHIP program, substance abuse programs, a nurse home visit

program, and veterans' health program. However, the entire trust fund balance as of July 1, 2002, about \$135 million, was transferred to the general fund to help balance the budget. The Legislature had passed a law authorizing the governor to "borrow" the funds for such purposes. The funds are supposed to be repaid to the endowment, but only if general funds are available.

In FY2002, Colorado allocated 15 percent of its settlement funds for tobacco prevention as required by state law, which was approximately \$12.72 million.

In a special session in October 2001, Governor Owens proposed legislation that would have cut the Tobacco Prevention Program in order to fund a Breast and Cervical Cancer treatment program for low-income women. Several legislators made a competing proposal to fund the treatment program from the state's general fund. The final compromise bill, passed by the Legislature and signed by the Governor, protected tobacco prevention funding. It initially used unallocated interest earned on tobacco settlement money to fund the treatment program, then gradually shifted funding to the general fund until the program would be fully funded from the general fund after six years.

As a result of the budget shortfall in 2003, FY2003 funding was cut to \$7.6 million and FY2004 funding was cut to \$3.8 million, a cut of 75 percent from the \$15 million initially appropriated in FY2003.

Also in 2003, the Legislature enacted and Governor Owens signed legislation authorizing the securitization, or sale to investors, of up to 60 percent of Colorado's tobacco settlement payments over the next 10 years for a smaller, up-front payment estimated at \$160 million. Securitization was authorized as an emergency step to raise revenue if needed between July 1 and November 30, 2003. The authorization expired without any securitization of the settlement funds.

Reduced funding continued in FY2005, resulting in an appropriation of \$4.3 million. In May 2004, the state House rejected another proposal to securitize the state's future settlement payments. The legislation had the support of Governor Owens and had already passed the Senate.

Use with Fact Sheet 4.2 "Master Settlement Agreement: Then and Now."

Source: Tobacco Free Kids, Special Reports, "State Tobacco Settlements, Colorado."

# The New York Times

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1999

## Philip Morris To Change Name to Altria

By JOHN SCHWARTZ - New York Times

Published: November 16, 2001

Philip Morris, the owner of one of the world's best-known corporate names, plans to change that name next year to the Altria Group, company executives said yesterday.

The new name, which is subject to approval by shareholders at the company's annual meeting next April, is drawn from the Latin word "altus," meaning "high," and is supposed to suggest high performance, said Steven C. Parrish, the company's senior vice president for corporate affairs, in an interview at the company's headquarters in New York.

The two tobacco companies under the Philip Morris umbrella, Philip Morris U.S.A. and Philip Morris International, will keep their names as will the food company Kraft Foods and the Miller Brewing Company, which are also owned by the consumer products conglomerate. But Philip Morris has not yet decided whether to change its stock symbol, the iconic MO.

"Call for Altria" doesn't have the ring of the company's "Call for Philip Morrrrrr-isssss!" slogan from radio's golden age. But that might be the point. The company has taken this action, its executives say, to reduce the drag on the company's reputation that association with the world's most famous cigarette maker has caused.

"When people say 'Philip Morris,' people don't know which company you're talking about," Mr. Parrish said. "We're more than a tobacco company, obviously, but there are a lot of people who don't understand that."

"They are running away from tobacco," countered David A. Kessler, former commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration and now the dean of the medical school at Yale University.

Martin Feldman, a tobacco analyst for Salomon Smith Barney, said, "It marks the end of an era for the tobacco industry in the United States," adding that the move was "of greater importance than Microsoft or G.E. changing their names." Mr. Feldman said that connection with tobacco has long depressed Philip Morris's stock price, even during the highflying days of the stock market bubble. The new name is, he said, a way of delivering on promises to become a better corporate citizen that Philip Morris made in its 1998 settlement with state attorneys general over health care costs related to tobacco use. "This is a highly symbolic gesture of its commitment to that promise," he said.

A longtime opponent of the tobacco industry, however, said a new name would not change the fact that Philip Morris's Marlboro cigarettes are by far the favorite brand of underage smokers. "It's sort of like the line from the Dragnet TV show, "This story is true, but the names have been changed to protect the innocent," said Matthew L. Myers, president of the National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids. "In this case it's 'The story is

true, but the names have been changed to protect the guilty.' "In the end, he said, "this is quintessential Philip Morris practice.

"Instead of changing its business practices, Philip Morris has chosen a public relations campaign to divert attention away from what it does."

Such remarks are predictable, warned the company's chief executive, Geoffrey C. Bible, in a message sent out to employees yesterday: "For sure, you can expect there will be some criticism of this proposed change. But I feel very confident that for the entire corporate enterprise, this is the right thing to do, and it is the time to do it."

The company hired an image consulting firm, Landor Associates, which developed a long list of possible names and helped the company winnow it. Names on the short list included "Consumarc" and "Marcade," both of which carried connotations of the consumer marketplace and brand names, Mr. Parrish said. The corporate practice of adopting vague, faux-Latinate names can help companies shed their image problems, said Michael Thibodeau, creative director of the New York office of FutureBrand, a consulting firm based in New York and London.

Mr. Thibodeau, author of "Smoke Gets in Your Eyes," a book about cigarette marketing, said that Philip Morris had been wounded in the tobacco wars, and had to erect a "fire wall" between its cigarettes and its food and beverage products.

"You don't want any carcinogenic associated with your macaroni and cheese," he said.

Mr. Thibodeau said the name suggested altruism, which is a central message that Philip Morris has tried to convey through donations to the arts and an aggressive advertising campaign that stresses such corporate good works as assisting battered women.

Mr. Parrish said, however, that "there certainly was and is no intent to convey altruism" through the new name, because, even though "it is very much a part of the company and the culture, we're very sensitive, in part because of some of the criticism we've gotten for speaking about it."

Dr. Kessler, the former Food and Drug Administration commissioner, suggested that the name change could indicate that Philip Morris was planning to spin off the lucrative tobacco business altogether. "It signals a broader potential change in corporate strategy," he said, "that tobacco is no longer king."

Mr. Parrish disagreed. "That is not why we're doing this -- I can assure you of that," he said. "We are not lessening our commitment to the business. Philip Morris means tobacco."

# The New York Times

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1999

December 16, 2005, New York Times

# Big Victory for Altria in Illinois

By MELANIE WARNER

The tobacco industry won a major victory yesterday in its battle with tobacco litigation lawyers. The Supreme Court of Illinois threw out a \$10 billion judgment against Philip Morris USA in a class-action suit that had accused the company of deceiving smokers by marketing its "light" cigarettes as having lower levels of tar and nicotine.

In a 4-to-2 decision, the court ruled that the use of "light" and "low tar" for cigarettes was authorized by the Federal Trade Commission and that Philip Morris could not be held liable for such marketing. The decision paves the way for an expected restructuring of Philip Morris's parent company, Altria, and a spinoff of its Kraft Foods division. Louis C. Camilleri, Altria's chief executive, has said the company is likely to pursue a restructuring once major litigation hurdles have been cleared.

An analyst, David Adelman of Morgan Stanley, said, "I think this is one of the most important decisions in the history of tobacco litigation." Philip Morris still faces two other significant legal challenges, but analysts say the Price case in Illinois - the lead plaintiff is Sharon Price - had been the most formidable, primarily because of its \$10 billion award. "This was the big risk to the company, both psychologically and financially," said Marc Greenberg, an analyst at Deutsche Bank.

Mr. Greenberg said that if Philip Morris was able to win a favorable ruling in the long-running Engle case in Florida, he thought the company could go through with a spinoff of Kraft by the middle of next year.

Altria had no comment on the decision other than to say it was "gratified" by the outcome. Altria owns 85 percent of Kraft's shares.

The ruling adds to an increasingly favorable litigation outlook for Philip Morris and is likely to cripple a whole class of cases.

While new tobacco suits are being filed every month, many have been dismissed. This year, more than 135 suits naming Philip Morris have been tossed out by courts.

In a presentation to investors in early November, Mr. Camilleri reported that there had been a "significant decline" in Philip Morris's outstanding case count.

Altria investors are eager to see a Kraft spinoff because they believe that the three parts - the domestic and international tobacco businesses and Kraft - are worth more separately than as a whole.

Analysts say a spinoff of Kraft, the nation's largest packaged food company, would allow Altria to make other acquisitions. Lately Kraft's earnings have sagged, and the company's management is looking for ways to both minimize exposure to fluctuating commodity prices and to sell healthier products.

Already, Altria has laid the groundwork for a spinoff. Departments like information technology and trademark management have been decentralized, and at least 100 corporate positions have been transferred to the operating companies.

But Altria is still not in the clear. The company is awaiting a decision in a Department of Justice suit as well as the class-action case in Florida, where the state Supreme Court is reviewing a \$145 billion award that was overturned on appeal. A decision is expected within a few months.

Philip Morris also faces 25 other potential class actions claiming that the marketing of "light" cigarettes deceived people into believing they are healthier, although those cases are not now perceived as a threat.

Plaintiff lawyers characterized the ruling yesterday as one based on narrow legal grounds relating to government regulation.

They point out that a lower Illinois court found in 2003 that Philip Morris's Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights cigarettes were not healthier than regular cigarettes and, in fact, were more toxic. That ruling was overturned yesterday.

"It's a terrible, sad day for consumers in Illinois," said Jeffrey S. Cooper, whose law firm, SimmonsCooper, is based in East Alton, Ill., and represents individuals with personal injury claims against tobacco companies.

Altria's stock rose \$2.89, or almost 4 percent, to \$76.62 a share.

Jonathan D. Glater contributed reporting for this article.



# 'We Are Not For Sale' Mural

**Time:** 2 weeks

**Materials:** Banner paper, markers, construction paper

<u>Summary:</u> Create a huge mural or banner with messages to the tobacco industry that you have read their documents and will be targeted no more.

#### Week Before:

- Have students create responses to the Tobacco Companies targeting of kids. Some ideas of responses could include: writing letters, designing posters (using the computer or hand-drawn), creating poems or signing petitions advocating that they will not be bought by Big Tobacco. Students can use quotes from Big Tobacco to get fired up (see fact sheet **4.3**).
- Have the students arrange these responses on banner paper. Make sure the main message is BIG and colorful! Possible messages could include:
- You can't tell me what to do
- I'm not going to listen to you Big Tobacco
- We are NOT for sale
- Decide where you want students to petition carrying their banner. This could be a walk outside in the neighborhood surrounding the school, or down the hallways inside the school.

#### Day Of:

- Have the students march with their banner. If appropriate, they can chant their message while walking.
- When finished with the march, ask permission to hang the banner in a visible place to all students. This could be in the gymnasium, down a main hallway or in the main lobby.



### Variation:

Collaborate with the school Art teacher and have the students create a visual mural with tiles or paint. This would be a great way to have a permanent message telling Big Tobacco to leave them alone! Students could also make a pledge to stay tobacco-free by creating a mural of hand-prints.

